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Why Smart Australasian Organisations Upgrade Over the Summer Break

2 December 2025 by
Rachel Cleary

Photo by Daniel Boberg on Unsplash

In New Zealand and Australia, the summer break is unlike any other period in the organisational calendar.


Beginning just before Christmas, stretching across the New Year, and gradually returning to full operational tempo in early February, creating a natural pause in business activity.


This rhythm which is predictable, culturally embedded, and operationally significant, offers a unique opportunity that many organisations underestimate.


While the country takes a collective breath, its network infrastructure can do the opposite: it can move forward.


This isn’t just a convenient window for maintenance. It is, in effect, the most strategically advantageous time of the year to modernise systems, reduce latent risks, and reposition the organisation for the year ahead. Yet many companies continue to treat summer shutdown as a time for minimal operational presence rather than deliberate technical renewal.


The real oversight is not the quiet period itself but failing to recognise how much resilience can be built during it.


The Real Issue Beneath the Surface

New Zealand organisations frequently run their networks hard throughout the year.


Systems that carry the weight of day-to-day operations including authentication servers, routing infrastructure, switching backbones, firewalls, monitoring tools, are rarely afforded the luxury of downtime.


Business continuity always feels too fragile, customer expectations too tight, staff availability too thin during the rest of the year.


The result is a form of silent technical debt: networks that function, but only just; systems patched reactively rather than strategically; infrastructure overdue for renewal but considered “too risky” to touch during busy periods.


The summer shutdown disrupts that logic nicely.


For three weeks, normal business processes slow, staff availability drops by design rather than accident, and demand on systems reaches its annual low. Where organisations see a staffing constraint, they should instead see operational freedom. Modernisation is not merely safer during this window, it is structurally easier, less disruptive, and far more controllable.


The misconception is simple: summer shutdown is seen as a time for holding ground, when in reality it is the perfect moment to invest in forward motion.


How We Got Here

To understand why the summer period carries such strategic value, we need to consider how New Zealand’s work cycle has evolved.


December is a month of accelerated deadlines. January is a month of dispersed staff, skeleton crews, and reduced external engagement. February marks the resetting of annual expectation's involving budgets, projects, risk reviews, and operational priorities.


This pattern creates strong organisational inertia. IT teams spend much of the year firefighting or managing incremental change. Larger infrastructure projects are pushed into the margins. Attempts to modernise network architectures, whether migrating to new switching fabrics, implementing SD-WAN, segmenting networks, refreshing firewalls, or introducing zero-trust-aligned identity controls, are repeatedly delayed because operational activity leaves little space for interruption.


Historically, many companies performed major upgrades over long weekends or public holidays. Yet this approach created pressure: tight windows, high stakes, and minimal room for error. The Christmas–New Year shutdown, by contrast, provides the one period where a multi-day or multi-week staged modernisation can occur without the same intensity of operational exposure.


Consequences for Organisations That Delay Modernisation

The risks of postponing infrastructure renewal rarely appear immediately.


They accumulate gradually, then manifest abruptly. For many organisations, the summer shutdown ironically becomes a time where hidden fragilities reveal themselves precisely because load decreases. Authentication delays, slow network paths, unexplained hardware resets, misconfigured VLANs, issues that were masked by constant throughput, become more visible when the system quietens.


The business consequences of untreated infrastructure weakness are real:


Operational disruption. Seemingly small failures around routing, switching, DNS, or firewalling ripple outward, affecting availability at the worst possible moments. A failure in February — at the start of a new business cycle — carries disproportionate reputational and financial impacts.


Regulatory exposure. For heavily-regulated entities and those working with critical national infrastructure, modernisation delays amplify operational-resilience risk. Identified weaknesses left unaddressed become governance liabilities, not technical ones.


Financial cost. The longer infrastructure is deferred, the more expensive the upgrade path becomes. Procurement windows tighten, compatibility gaps widen, and emergency remediation always costs more than planned renewal.


Reputational damage. Clients expect stable, well-managed systems. An outage early in the year sets a narrative: the organisation is ill-prepared.


Resilience implications. An unmodernised network is not simply inefficient, it is fragile. Resilience is not built on intention but on architecture, controls, and clarity of design.


The irony is stark. The best time to mitigate these risks arrives once a year, yet many organisations let it pass quietly.


Why the Risk Persists

If the summer period offers such clear operational benefits, why do so few organisations use it strategically?


The reasons are less technical than cultural.


First, there is the persistent fear of touching working systems. This “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mindset remains deeply embedded in many IT environments. Yet this belief reveals more about organisational risk misunderstanding than system reliability. Stability is not evidence of resilience. It is simply evidence of functioning under current conditions.


Second, staffing scarcity is often misinterpreted. Reduced operational staff increases the safety of major upgrades by reducing impact. Modernisation work is typically handled by specialist IT personnel or external contracted partners who are not constrained by the same holiday patterns.


Third, there is often a governance blind spot. Boards and executives rarely tie infrastructure renewal to risk appetite and resilience planning. Modernisation is viewed as a cost centre activity rather than a core strategic control. This leads to budget deferrals, which then force technical teams to maintain systems beyond their intended lifecycle.


Finally, many organisations underestimate how much operational disruption can be avoided through effective change windows. When the majority of customers, clients, suppliers, and staff are also offline, the risk surface shrinks dramatically. Outage tolerance is not zero, however, it is significantly higher than at any other point in the year.


What Effective Mitigation Looks Like

Modernisation during the summer shutdown is not an act of improvisation.


It requires planning, clarity, and staged execution. But it is far more achievable than organisations often assume.


Effective strategies begin with honest risk identification.


Networks accumulate vulnerabilities not because engineers lack skill but because systems age, dependencies grow, and architectural drift sets in. Identifying which components impose the greatest current risk provides the foundation for controlled modernisation.


A second step is understanding impact and likelihood in the context of seasonal opportunity.


A January outage has lower business impact and higher resilience payoff than one occurring in March or November. The same risk assessment framework applies; the seasonal variable shifts the decision calculus.


Controls can then be applied proportionately.


These might include:

  • refreshing switching or routing infrastructure
  • completing long-delayed firewall replacements
  • implementing network segmentation for improved containment
  • migrating to modern identity and access control models
  • decommissioning legacy systems
  • performing architecture-level redesign
  • upgrading OS to Windows 11


Crucially, residual risk must be documented and accepted at the executive level.


Modernisation eliminates some risks but reveals others, such as configuration uncertainties, integration questions, and temporary windows of reduced redundancy.


What matters is not achieving perfection but achieving a more resilient baseline before full operational return in February.


Finally, monitoring and validation close the loop. Summer upgrades allow longer observation periods, with lower stakes, enabling teams to identify issues while the organisation is still in low-intensity mode.


The Strategic Lens

From a governance perspective, the summer shutdown is not simply a maintenance window — it is a strategic resilience opportunity.


Boards should ask a simple question: if this is not the time to modernise infrastructure, when will be? The rest of the year offers no comparable moment of reduced operational dependency.


This is why the conversation belongs not only in IT meetings but in boardrooms.


Modernisation is a risk decision. It shapes exposure, continuity, and the organisation’s capacity to recover from inevitable disruptions. The board’s responsibility is not to understand the technical mechanics but to recognise the operational consequences of deferred action.


Investment decisions made in November often determine whether February begins with confidence or fragility.


Summer shutdown is not merely a pause — it is a pivot opportunity.


Every organisation relies on its network infrastructure more than it acknowledges. And every organisation benefits from the seasonal rhythm that New Zealand reliably provides. The question, then, is whether leaders will use the quietest period of the year to strengthen the foundations on which the entire organisation depends.


In the end, resilience isn’t built upon reaction — it’s built on preparation.